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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal presents this Court with an important 
question of first impression pertaining to federal subject- 
matter jurisdiction over a complaint by an insured 
predicated on the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 
("NFIA") but actually sounding in tort. The plaintiffs' 
complaint alleges that Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance 
Company ("Liberty Mutual"), a private insurer, violated New 
Jersey state law during its investigation and adjustment of 
a claim under a policy issued by it pursuant to the NFIA. 
The plaintiffs do not allege diversity of citizenship but 
assert exclusive federal jurisdiction under the NFIA. 
Although the parties and the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey did not address this issue, we 
have an independent duty to determine whether the district 
court had subject-matter jurisdiction. We vacate the district 
court's judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual and remand the 
case with instructions to dismiss the complaint.* 
 
I. 
 
The plaintiffs, Re and Jo Van Holt, own a home in Sea 
Bright, New Jersey. The town of Sea Bright is located on a 
narrow strip of land bounded by the Shrewsbury River on 
one side and the Atlantic Ocean on the other. The Van 
Holts' home is located in an area that floods frequently. In 
October 1991, Sea Bright was flooded, resulting in damage 
to the Van Holts' home and personal property. In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* Although Judge Lewis heard argument in this case, he has been 
unable, however, to clear this written opinion because of illness. 
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connection with this flood, the Van Holts filed two claims 
with their insurer, the defendant, Liberty Mutual. Liberty 
Mutual paid the claims by check in the Summer of 1992. 
The Van Holts received and cashed Liberty Mutual's checks 
without objection. On December 11, 1992, the Van Holts' 
home and personal property were again damaged by 
flooding which resulted from high winds and rain. The 
present dispute between the Van Holts and Liberty Mutual 
primarily centers on the damage caused by the December 
11 flood. 
 
The Van Holts held two insurance policies issued by 
Liberty Mutual, the first was a homeowner's policy, the 
other was a flood insurance policy issued pursuant to the 
National Flood Insurance Program ("NFIP"). See 42 U.S.C. 
SS 4001-129 (codification of the NFIA). The Van Holts made 
claims on both policies for the damages resulting from the 
December 11 flood.1 They hired their own claims adjuster, 
Robert C. Ascher. Following an inspection of the Van Holts' 
home and property, Ascher submitted a list of damaged 
property to Kevin Grelle, Liberty Mutual's claims adjuster. 
On behalf of Liberty Mutual, Grelle refused to pay the 
claimed damages because the list was incomplete. 
According to a letter from Grelle to Ascher dated June 7, 
1993, Grelle rejected Ascher's list because it did not set 
forth the values of the items claimed and the Van Holts had 
not signed each page as required by the insurance policies. 
 
When six months passed without payment of their 
claims, in June of 1993, the Van Holts, through Ascher, 
filed a complaint against Liberty Mutual with the New 
Jersey Department of Insurance. The department forwarded 
the complaint to Liberty Mutual and requested that the 
company provide the reasons why the claim was taking so 
long to evaluate. In response, Grelle stated that he believed 
that the Van Holts had attempted to defraud Liberty 
Mutual by inflating the extent of their damages and 
claiming damage to property that had been destroyed or 
damaged, not in the December 11 flood, but in the earlier 
October 1991 flood. In his investigation report, Grelle 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Because the claims made under the homeowner's policy do not affect 
the result in this case, we do not discuss them. 
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stated that, among other things, the Van Holts made claims 
for damage to property stored in the basement of their 
home which was caused by the October 1991 flood. Liberty 
Mutual had denied coverage for this damage when it 
partially paid the October 1991 claim because theflood 
insurance policy excluded coverage for damage to property 
stored in the insured's basement. After additional 
investigation, including an under-oath examination of the 
Van Holts by Liberty Mutual's attorneys, on June 16, 1995, 
Liberty Mutual formally denied the Van Holts' claims on the 
ground that they were fraudulent. 
 
On December 15, 1995, the Van Holts sued Liberty 
Mutual in the United States District Court for the District 
of New Jersey. In their complaint, the Van Holts alleged 
that Liberty Mutual committed two state-law torts and 
asserted that subject-matter jurisdiction was proper 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 4053, a provision of the NFIA.2 
They cited no other statutory provision. Specifically, the 
plaintiffs averred that Liberty Mutual's failure to pay their 
claims and the company's allegation that the claims were 
fraudulent violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, 
N.J.S.A. SS 56:8-1 to 56:8-48, and New Jersey common law 
requiring parties to an insurance contract to act in good 
faith. See Pickett v. Lloyd's, 621 A.2d 445, 451-52 (N.J. 
1993); see also Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 690 
A.2d 575, 587 (N.J. 1997) (discussing duty of good faith in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. 42 U.S.C. S 4053 provides: 
 
       The insurance companies and other insurers which form, associate, 
       or otherwise join together in the pool under this part may adjust 
       and pay all claims for proved and approved losses covered by flood 
       insurance in accordance with provisions of this chapter and, upon 
       disallowance by any such company or other insurer of any such 
       claim, or upon the refusal of the claimant to accept the amount 
       allowed upon any such claim, the claimant, within one year after 
       the date of mailing of notice of disallowance or partial 
disallowance 
       of the claim, may institute an action on such claim against such 
       company or other insurer in the United States district court for 
the 
       district in which the insured property or major part thereof shall 
       have been situated, and original exclusive jurisdiction is hereby 
       conferred upon such court to hear and determine such action 
       without regard to the amount in controversy. 
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other contractual contexts). Following discovery, the district 
court entered summary judgment for Liberty Mutual. The 
Van Holts filed a timely notice of appeal. We vacate the 
district court's December 2, 1996 judgment and remand 
this case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject- 
matter jurisdiction. 
 
II. 
 
It is undisputed that Liberty Mutual issued theflood 
insurance policy to the Van Holts pursuant to the NFIP. 
The NFIP is a federally supervised and guaranteed 
insurance program presently administered by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") pursuant to the 
NFIA and its corresponding regulations. See 44 C.F.R. 
SS 59.1-77.2. Congress created the program to, among 
other things, limit the damage caused by flood disasters 
through prevention and protective measures, spread the 
risk of flood damage among many private insurers and the 
federal government, and make flood insurance "available on 
reasonable terms and conditions" to those in need of it. See 
42 U.S.C. S 4001(a)(1)-(4). 
 
Initially, under what is referred to as Part A of the NFIA, 
a pool of private insurance companies issued flood 
insurance policies and administered the NFIP pursuant to 
a contract with the United States Department of Housing 
and Urban Development. See 42 U.S.C. SS 4051-53; see 
generally Spence v. Omaha Indem. Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 793, 
794 n.1 (5th Cir. 1993) (discussing the initial workings and 
organization of the program under the Act); Berger v. Pierce, 
933 F.2d 393, 394-96 (6th Cir. 1991) (same). Under Part A, 
if a pool company refused to pay a claim under aflood 
insurance policy, the insured was permitted to sue the pool 
insurance company "on ... [the] claim" in federal district 
court regardless of the amount in controversy. See 42 
U.S.C. S 4053. 
 
On January 1, 1978, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 4071, HUD 
ended its contractual relationship with the association and 
assumed greater responsibility for operating the NFIP, 
although still maintaining the assistance of the private 
insurance industry. See generally In re Estate of Lee, 812 
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F.2d 253, 256 (5th Cir. 1987) (discussing HUD takeover of 
NFIP); National Flood Insurers Ass'n v. Harris, 444 F. Supp. 
969 (D.C. 1977) (same). This arrangement, which is 
presently in force, is called Part B. FEMA began 
administering the NFIP through the Flood Insurance 
Administration. 
 
In 1983, pursuant to regulatory authority granted by 
Congress in 42 U.S.C. S 4081(a), FEMA created the "Write 
Your Own" program. See 44 C.F.R. 62.23-24. Under this 
program, private insurance companies like Liberty Mutual 
write their own insurance policies, issue them to those in 
need of flood insurance, hold premiums from those policies 
in accounts separate from their other business, and pay 
necessary claims and refunds out of the segregated 
accounts. See 44 C.F.R. S 62.23(a); 44 C.F.R. Pt. 62, App. 
A, Arts. II(E), (D); see also Spence, 996 F.2d at 794 n.1. 
FEMA guarantees payment of claims through letters of 
credit issued on behalf of the private insurance companies 
which may be tapped in the event that the claims against 
policies exceed a company's net premium income. See 44 
C.F.R. Pt. 62, App. A, Art. IV. FEMA also provides 
reinsurance. The private insurance companies must use 
the Standard Flood Insurance Policy ("SFIP"), which is 
contained in the regulations. See 44 C.F.R. Pt. 61, App. 
A(1). Under Part B, an insured may sue FEMA if it adjusts 
a claim and improperly refuses to pay benefits. See 42 
U.S.C. S 4072.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Section 4072 provides: 
 
       In the event the program is carried out as provided in section 4071 
       of this title, the Director shall be authorized to adjust and make 
       payment of any claims for proved and approved losses covered by 
       flood insurance, and upon the disallowance by the Director of any 
       such claim, or upon the refusal of the claimant to accept the 
       amount allowed upon any such claim, the claimant, within one year 
       after the date of mailing of notice of disallowance or partial 
       disallowance by the Director, may institute an action against the 
       Director on such claim in the United States district court for the 
       district in which the insured property or the major part thereof 
shall 
       have been situated, and original exclusive jurisdiction is hereby 
       conferred upon such court to hear and determine such action 
       without regard to the amount in controversy. 
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The parties have not raised any question whether the 
district court had subject-matter jurisdiction of the Van 
Holts' complaint and the district court did not consider the 
matter. It is central to our federal system that, unlike the 
state courts, the federal courts are courts of limited 
jurisdiction. "[T]hey have only the power that is authorized 
by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted 
by Congress pursuant thereto." Bender v. Williamsport Area 
Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (citation omitted). 
Accordingly, a federal court of appeals has a special 
obligation to satisfy itself of the district court's basis for 
subject-matter jurisdiction even if the parties are prepared 
to concede it. Id.; Pennsylvania Nurses Ass'n v. 
Pennsylvania State Educ. Ass'n, 90 F.3d 797, 800 (3d Cir. 
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 947 (1997); Lyon v. Whisam, 
45 F.3d 758, 759 (3d Cir. 1995). Generally, the federal 
courts have subject-matter jurisdiction of a complaint when 
it asserts a cause of action arising under some provision of 
federal law, see 28 U.S.C. S 1331, such as when Congress 
creates a cause of action within the bounds of Article III of 
the United States Constitution, or when the parties are of 
diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds 
the jurisdictional minimum, which at the time this case 
was filed was $50,000. See 28 U.S.C. S 1332 (1995). 
 
In accordance with our duty to raise subject-matter 
jurisdiction, on March 28, 1998, we requested counsel for 
the parties to submit supplement briefs on the issue of 
jurisdiction. In their supplemental brief, the Van Holts 
argued that subject-matter jurisdiction was proper in the 
federal court because they sought damages "under" the 
flood insurance policy and that, in 42 U.S.C. S 4053, 
Congress granted to the federal courts "exclusive 
jurisdiction ... over disputes involving flood insurance 
policies." Liberty Mutual also believes that the district court 
had subject-matter jurisdiction because the gravamen of 
the claims related to "the processing and denial of the flood 
claim." It conceded, however, that "the complaint is 
problematic as the only counts of the complaint read as 
consumer fraud and bad faith claims" and acknowledged 
that the Van Holts' complaint does not contain a claim for 
"benefits under the flood policy." 
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In their complaint, the plaintiffs assert that federal 
subject-matter jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
S 4053 and a provision in the Standard Flood Insurance 
Policy governing the relationship between Liberty Mutual 
and the Van Holts, which provides: 
 
       You may not sue us to recover money under this policy 
       unless you have complied with all of the requirements 
       of the policy. If you do sue, you must start the suit 
       within 12 months from the date we mailed you notice 
       that we have denied your claim, or part of your claim, 
       and you must file the suit in the United States District 
       Court of the district in which the insured property was 
       located at the time of the loss. 
 
44 C.F.R. Pt. 61, App. A(1), Art. 9(R) (italics in original). 
 
We first consider the statutory basis for jurisdiction. It is 
axiomatic that when a court interprets a statute, its sole 
task is to ascertain the statute's meaning and enforce it 
according to its terms. United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 
489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v. United 
States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)). When considering such 
a question, the inquiry must begin with the plain language 
of the statute itself. Id. at 241; United States v. Schneider, 
14 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1994). That is because the best 
evidence of congressional intent is the text of the statute. 
See West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 
98 (1990); Schneider, 14 F.3d at 879. The court, however, 
must look not only to the particular statutory language, but 
to the design of the statute as a whole and its objectives 
and policies. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 
158 (1990); Schneider, 14 F.3d at 879. 
 
It is apparent from the plain language of S 4053, that it 
provides subject-matter jurisdiction only for a coverage, or 
breach of contract, cause of action based on a denial of an 
insurance claim and not for state-law torts which arise out 
of the claims investigation and adjustment procedure 
executed by the insurance company. Section 4053 provides 
that an insured may institute a lawsuit on a "claim" on the 
policy when the claim has been "disallow[ed]." We interpret 
this language to refer only to suits challenging the failure to 
pay the insurance "claim." The language makes no explicit 
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or implicit reference to other causes of action that may 
arise during a claims investigation. Indeed, if claims like 
the Van Holts' were allowed in federal court it would not be 
necessary for the insurance company to first deny coverage. 
Conceivably, the insurance company could commit state- 
law torts even when it pays the claim, by delaying payment 
or engaging in other misconduct in the adjustment process. 
Congress could have chosen to use broader language, such 
as "relating to the insurance policy" or "relating to the 
claim's investigation or adjustment." It chose not to do so. 
Thus, we must respect Congress' choice and cannot add 
language to the statute where none exists. 
 
In their complaint, the Van Holts do not assert a cause 
of action "on ... [their] claim" under the Liberty Mutual 
flood insurance policy. As the defendant acknowledges, the 
Van Holts do not assert that Liberty Mutual's failure to pay 
the claim was a breach of the flood insurance policy or 
request that the district court order that Liberty Mutual 
cover their losses. Instead, the plaintiffs, citing New Jersey 
state law, claim that Liberty Mutual committed two torts in 
the course of the investigation and adjustment of their 
insurance claims and request damages to compensate them 
for their losses suffered as a result of these torts and to 
punish Liberty Mutual for committing the torts.4 
 
Neither the plain language nor the object and policies of 
the NFIA and its regulations tend to show that Congress 
intended to provide for subject-matter jurisdiction for state- 
law torts arising out of flood insurance polices. See Spence, 
996 F.2d at 796. Indeed, the legislative history of S 4053 
specifically states that, even though claimants may sue for 
coverage in federal court, they maintain the right to pursue 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Liberty Mutual contends that there is federal subject-matter 
jurisdiction for a claim under state bad-faith law because such a claim 
is a contract claim. See Pickett, 621 A.2d at 452 (refusing to 
characterize 
bad faith claim as having basis in tort or contract law). This argument 
is unpersuasive because federal law, namely the language of S 4053, 
determines what claims are permitted in federal court and there is no 
evidence that Congress intended to incorporate state bad-faith law into 
S 4053. Cf. Spence, 996 F.2d at 796 (in statute of limitations issues, 
federal interests in regulation of flood insurance do not require that 
state 
law be disregarded when insured asserts state-law torts against insurer). 
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other "legal remedies in State courts." H.R. Rep. No. 1585, 
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2873, 3022; see also 
Possessky v. National Flood Insurers Ass'n, 507 F. Supp. 
913, 915 (D. N.J. 1981) (quoting House of Representatives 
report). Also, the present regulations provide for substantial 
independence of the private Write-Your-Own companies in 
the adjustment and investigation of claims, see 44 C.F.R. 
S 62.23(e), do not permit the companies to draw down on 
the letters of credit for claims of fraud, and that the 
insurance companies are not agents of the federal 
government. Spence, 996 F.2d at 796 & ns.15-17.5 
 
Allowing jurisdiction over claims such as the Van Holts' 
would have far reaching implications for the federal courts 
and insurance law, implications not intended by Congress. 
If we found subject-matter jurisdiction, we would have to 
conclude either that Congress intended federal courts to 
enforce state-law imposed duties in all flood insurance 
cases or that Congress intended to create a federal common 
law regulating insurance company practices when there is 
no indication that state courts and state legislatures are 
incapable of carrying out this function. There is no evidence 
either in the NFIA or the legislative history that Congress 
intended such a result. 
 
Although it addressed a slightly different issue, we find 
the reasoning in Spence instructive. In Spence, the 
plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court alleging that 
the defendant, an insurance company, breached the flood 
insurance policy issued to them when it refused to cover 
their losses and committed torts under Texas state law 
during the claims adjustment and investigation procedure. 
The defendant argued that all the claims, including the 
state-law claims, were barred by the one-year suit 
limitations period contained in the SFIP. See 44 C.F.R. Pt. 
61, App. A(1), Art. VIII(Q). The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the defendant's 
argument, holding that Texas state law, and not the NFIA, 
provided the limitations period for the state law torts. The 
Spence court held that the independence granted insurance 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Section 4072 does not permit jurisdiction because it allows suit only 
against FEMA which is not a party to this action. 
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companies in claims adjustment, the fact that the 
companies are not government agents, and that companies 
may not draw down on letters of credit for fraud claims 
evidenced that Congress did not intend to federalize state- 
law claims in the flood-insurance context. That same 
reasoning applies here. There is simply no indication that 
Congress intended to create jurisdiction for any claims 
other than coverage claims. 
 
As with S 4053, the provision in the insurance policy 
issued to the Van Holts--the identical one construed by the 
Spence court--provides only for a coverage claim. The 
clause narrowly provides that suit must be in federal court 
if the suit seeks to recover money "under this policy" and 
makes no mention of other causes of action or implies that 
they would be covered. (Emphasis added). Regardless, even 
if the provision allowed for a right to sue in federal court for 
causes of actions other than coverage claims, it is 
insufficient, on its own, to confer federal subject-matter 
jurisdiction over a complaint. It is well settled that parties 
cannot confer subject-matter jurisdiction either by 
agreement or by waiver. See, e.g., Brown v. Francis, 75 F.3d 
860, 866 (3d Cir. 1996); United Indus. Workers v. 
Government of Virgin Islands, 987 F.2d 162, 168 (3d Cir. 
1993) (collecting cases). 
 
Finally, diversity of citizenship does not provide a basis of 
subject-matter jurisdiction here. The plaintiffs do not allege 
that the parties are diverse and we have searched the 
complaint in vain for any allegation of the parties' 
citizenship or a reference to the diversity statute. The Van 
Holts contend only that subject-matter jurisdiction is 
premised on S 4053. It is the plaintiffs' burden to allege a 
basis for subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(a)(1). They have failed to do so. Hence, the complaint 
must be dismissed. 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's December 
2, 1996 judgment is vacated. This case will be remanded to 
the district court with instructions to dismiss for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction. Costs taxed against appellants. 
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